Hizb ut-Tahrir presents itself as a disciplined international organization led by one Amir. Beneath that image sits a far more concentrated system in which a small number of men control regions, money, reports, complaints and access to the leadership.
Members far from Istanbul are asked to trust that the instructions reaching them came from Ata, that their complaints reached him intact and that the money leaving their countries was used for the purpose they were told. The accounts examined here repeatedly show how little ability those members have to verify any of those assumptions.
The Mandoobs did not accidentally become this powerful. They were appointed, retained and empowered by the leadership above them. In Syria, that leadership went further, approving a departure from the party’s claimed nonviolent method that brought money, weapons and fighters into an armed conflict.
For years, members could blame a bad Mu’tamid, a dishonest Mandoob or a corrupt official and still tell themselves that the Amir would correct the problem if only he knew.
After examining the structure from the local branches to Istanbul, that explanation becomes much harder to sustain.
The problem does not stop at the men around Ata. It reaches the man who put them there.