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U.S. Election · Chapter 2 of 22

U.S. Election

2. Fifty States, Four Voting Sites

The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities. Ashraf created a Signal group for Electoral Committee members, distributed the election instructions, invited questions, and told members outside Chicago that they could participate remotely. Chicago members were instructed to vote in person; members elsewhere could travel to Chicago or vote by phone. This was not a speculative proposal. It was a working practice used in the previous council election.

Ashraf’s August 21, 2022 voting instructions were detailed. Members voting remotely were to write down the candidates they supported, wait for his call, send their ballot image through Signal, and receive confirmation. Ashraf and two assistants were to verify receipt, record the selections on paper, and count that confirmed ballot. For that Majlis contest, each member could select up to five candidates. Ashraf also told participants that the rules excluded him, as election delegate, from casting a vote. Those rules are not identical to every later local Electoral Body contest, but they demonstrate that the organization had already used remote participation, transparent instructions, and a shared administrative channel.

A national election without a national room

In 2025, Fawzy proposed one Signal or WhatsApp group for all twenty-nine Electoral Body members across the United States. The purpose was administrative: participants would receive the same dates, notices, candidate information, and instructions at the same time. This closely resembled the communication approach used in 2022. Abu Amr rejected it.

He first raised security concerns about placing Electoral Body members together in one group. Fawzy replied that the organization already used these platforms internally, and the members selected to administer or vote in a national election needed a consistent understanding of its procedures. Abu Amr then raised the prospect of complaints being posted to the group. Fawzy offered an administrator-only format, which would have made the group a one-way information channel. Abu Amr still refused.

The objection then shifted toward geography. Why, Abu Amr asked, should a member in one American city know who belonged to the Electoral Body in another? That answer treated a national electorate as several separate local rooms. The practical result, according to Fawzy’s account, was that voters could not easily compare whether the same rules, deadlines, and exceptions were being announced across the country.

The contrast with 2022 was not whether Signal was technologically possible. The organization had already demonstrated that it was. The difference was whether the national participants would be allowed a common view of the process.

Four voting sites for fifty states

Abu Amr also sought to concentrate in-person participation around four centers: California, Dallas, Chicago, and New York. Fawzy objected:

“We have 50 states here.”

The burden was uneven. Members living near those cities could participate relatively easily; members elsewhere might need airfare, a hotel, leave from work, and advance notice. A change from remote voting to required travel could affect who managed to cast a ballot, regardless of what each person intended to vote for.

A later internal discussion involving Hatib addressed the effect of forcing members to vote in person in Chicago. He described the possibility of sincere members withdrawing as a protest against a process they believed unfair. His comment is evidence of contemporaneous concern about the voting arrangements, not a completed count of votes that were lost.

The significant point is the before-and-after. In 2022, Ashraf explained an open process and a remote option through a shared Signal room. In 2025, Fawzy proposed a comparable national communications room and was refused; a small set of physical sites became a central question. They made it harder for members in different cities to see the same election as one continuous, uniformly administered process.

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3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning. →

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility.

The Election Behind the Curtain

Choose a complete chapter or section.

  1. Introduction
  2. Part I — How the Election Was Supposed to Work
  3. 1. The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow
  4. 2. Fifty States, Four Voting Sites
  5. Part II — The Election Breaks Down
  6. 3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.
  7. 4. The Private “Majlis” Group
  8. 5. Eight Candidates Became Six
  9. 6. Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections
  10. 7. Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed
  11. 8. The Complaints Become a National Case
  12. Part III — Who Controlled the Amir’s Channel?
  13. 9. Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.
  14. 10. Bilal Knew Before Fawzy
  15. 11. Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing
  16. 12. The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer
  17. 13. Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul
  18. 14. Authority Before the Paperwork
  19. Part IV — Preserving the Result
  20. 15. The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide
  21. 16. “Why Don’t You Fire Him?”
  22. 17. Ayman Returns
  23. 18. The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe
  24. 19. The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election
  25. Part V — What the Election Exposed
  26. 20. Inside the Machine
  27. 21. America Was Not the First Warning
  28. 22. The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent
  29. Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.
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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In 2025, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s American branch held an internal election to choose its next national council, the Majlis.

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CHAPTER 01

The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow

The rules were neither unwritten nor newly invented in 2025.

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CHAPTER 02

Fifty States, Four Voting Sites

The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities.

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CHAPTER 03

Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility.

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CHAPTER 04

The Private “Majlis” Group

In August 2022, Ashraf warned American election participants that campaigning for other nominees would create a favored list and eventually a subgroup inside Hizb ut-Tahrir.

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CHAPTER 05

Eight Candidates Became Six

Chicago’s candidate list created a second problem.

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CHAPTER 06

Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections

The Dallas dispute was easier to understand because the violation appeared inside the count itself.

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CHAPTER 07

Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed

Diwan was not only a candidate.

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CHAPTER 08

The Complaints Become a National Case

By the time the election moved toward final approval, complaints had reached the American leadership from Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago.

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CHAPTER 09

Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.

Fawzy communicated with Ata Abu Rashta through the recognized channel used by the American Mu’tamid to reach the global Amir.

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CHAPTER 10

Bilal Knew Before Fawzy

The most damaging concern about the channel did not come from technical metadata.

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CHAPTER 11

Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing

The emails carrying the Amir’s authority contained unusual technical details that raised questions about who was preparing and sending them.

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CHAPTER 12

The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer

Khalid, a senior Hizb ut-Tahrir member based in Chicago, had encountered a similar problem years before the 2025 election.

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CHAPTER 13

Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul

Abu Talha—Mohammad Malkawi—was not an ordinary member hearing the controversy secondhand.

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CHAPTER 14

Authority Before the Paperwork

Three episodes came to embody the same chronology: Abu Amr’s advance knowledge of a channel message, Khalid’s earlier complaint, and the transition to Abdu Rafy as Mu’tamid.

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CHAPTER 15

The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide

By the time the final election result reached Fawzy, the national leadership had already reviewed complaints from multiple localities.

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CHAPTER 16

“Why Don’t You Fire Him?”

The Dallas dispute did not disappear after leadership restored the original result.

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CHAPTER 17

Ayman Returns

Ayman’s case did not end when he was removed from the Majlis contest.

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CHAPTER 18

The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe

After Fawzy refused to sign the election result, leadership still had a problem.

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CHAPTER 19

The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election

The most important institutional fact in the entire story is also one of the simplest.

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CHAPTER 20

Inside the Machine

By this point, the role of the Mandub becomes essential to understanding why the American complaints were so difficult to resolve.

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CHAPTER 21

America Was Not the First Warning

The American crisis did not arise in a vacuum.

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CHAPTER 22

The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent

The American election controversy raises a disturbing question about the men who witnessed serious wrongdoing within Hizb ut-Tahrir and then continued promoting the organization as a model for Islamic revival.

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.

The 2025 American election ended with a recognized result.

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