The most important institutional fact in the entire story is also one of the simplest.
Before the replacement Majlis took office, all five members of the sitting American Majlis rejected the election.
Fawzy, Diwan, Irfan, Hatib, and Abdul Muqeet had different personalities and different relationships with the organization. They had not all entered the dispute through the same complaint. What united them was their access to the national record.
They saw Dallas.
They saw Chicago.
They saw Ayman’s restriction and continued campaign involvement.
They saw Ayman’s written statement that Bilal had told him to act.
They saw Diwan accepted and then removed.
They saw the complaints sent upward without a meaningful accounting.
They saw the questions surrounding the Amir’s channel.
They saw the chronology in which Abu Amr appeared to know a message before Fawzy formally received it.
And they saw the organization continue toward installation of the new leadership.
Their conclusion was not a request for one more recount or one more clarification:
“We do not recognize it.”
That verdict matters because it came from the council charged with national responsibility while the election was occurring.
Contemporaneous messages show the council’s alarm before the new leadership was installed. One discussion records Fawzy and other members considering resignation after the Dallas result was reversed. Another captures Irfan’s question about why Ayman appeared in the candidate process while discipline remained outstanding. They are evidence of an active dispute inside the sitting Majlis, not a controversy assembled only after the transition.
Leadership could later attack Fawzy individually, but it could not erase the fact that the rejection was shared across the sitting Majlis before the new council assumed power.