Hizb ut-TahrirExposed.
U.S. Election · Chapter 9 of 22

Part III — Who Controlled the Amir’s Channel?

In June 2024, a single televised debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump exposed a question that political loyalty had long obscured: was an aging leader still capable of exercising the authority entrusted to him? Biden's performance triggered a crisis of confidence that ultimately ended his reelection campaign. Hizb ut-Tahrir must confront an equally uncomfortable question about its own Amir, Ata Abu Rashta, who turns 84 in 2027. How does an 83-year-old man personally oversee an international organization, manage its leadership, evaluate complaints from different countries, and maintain control over decisions communicated through modern technology? Age alone does not establish incapacity, but neither does unquestioning loyalty establish competence. An organization that promises the Muslim world Islamic governance cannot expect its members to accept every instruction bearing the Amir's authority without examining who actually wrote it, who delivered it, and whether the Amir personally authorized it. The American election exposed precisely this crisis of accountability: communications carrying the authority of the highest office passed through intermediaries whose influence and control became central to the dispute.

U.S. Election

9. Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.

Fawzy communicated with Ata Abu Rashta through the recognized channel used by the American Mu’tamid to reach the global Amir. In July 2025, when he was seeking answers about Ayman and the disputed election, the integrity of that channel was central: a response ostensibly from the Amir had authority far beyond the person who physically forwarded it. Members trusted that route because Hizb ut-Tahrir’s internal discipline depended upon it. A member was expected to use the structure rather than bypass it; once a complaint reached the Amir’s channel, the resulting decision was expected to carry final authority.

The American election tested that assumption.

Complaints moved upward, but meaningful answers did not return. At the same time, decisions preserving the disputed election continued moving downward under the Amir’s authority.

Dallas lost the corrected result produced through its rerun. Diwan lost his accepted candidacy. The five candidates promoted through the Chicago effort remained in the field. Ayman’s campaign advantage was not undone.

The contrast troubled the sitting Majlis. The channel appeared capable of acting quickly when an instruction preserved the election. It appeared unable to provide equally clear answers when the American leadership challenged how that election had been administered.

The most unusual reply came after repeated questions concerning Ayman and the election. On July 11, Fawzy received a message that, rather than closing with Ata’s customary signature, ended:

“Your channel.”

In a July 12 exchange, Fawzy described why he regarded the wording as unusual. He expressed his conviction that Abu Amr had written the response. He questioned why a response purportedly from the Amir would be signed “your channel” and why the email carried indications associated with the UAE rather than the expected Istanbul context. Another participant voiced suspicion about the relationship between Ossama Abu Zayd, also known as Ossama Matr, and Bilal. These messages document the concern at the time; the original emails and full headers remain the appropriate records for testing the technical claim.

The reply also told Fawzy to apologize after he continued pressing his questions.

For a leadership team already wondering whether its complaints were reaching Ata directly, the wording deepened the concern. The official route no longer felt like a transparent conversation between the American Mu’tamid and the Amir. It felt like a controlled interface between them.

The question was no longer merely, “Why did Ata reject this complaint?” It became, “What did Ata actually receive, and who was shaping what came back?”

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10. Bilal Knew Before Fawzy →

The most damaging concern about the channel did not come from technical metadata.

The Election Behind the Curtain

Choose a complete chapter or section.

  1. Introduction
  2. Part I — How the Election Was Supposed to Work
  3. 1. The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow
  4. 2. Fifty States, Four Voting Sites
  5. Part II — The Election Breaks Down
  6. 3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.
  7. 4. The Private “Majlis” Group
  8. 5. Eight Candidates Became Six
  9. 6. Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections
  10. 7. Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed
  11. 8. The Complaints Become a National Case
  12. Part III — Who Controlled the Amir’s Channel?
  13. 9. Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.
  14. 10. Bilal Knew Before Fawzy
  15. 11. Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing
  16. 12. The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer
  17. 13. Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul
  18. 14. Authority Before the Paperwork
  19. Part IV — Preserving the Result
  20. 15. The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide
  21. 16. “Why Don’t You Fire Him?”
  22. 17. Ayman Returns
  23. 18. The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe
  24. 19. The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election
  25. Part V — What the Election Exposed
  26. 20. Inside the Machine
  27. 21. America Was Not the First Warning
  28. 22. The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent
  29. Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.
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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In 2025, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s American branch held an internal election to choose its next national council, the Majlis.

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CHAPTER 01

The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow

The rules were neither unwritten nor newly invented in 2025.

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CHAPTER 02

Fifty States, Four Voting Sites

The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities.

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CHAPTER 03

Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility.

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CHAPTER 04

The Private “Majlis” Group

In August 2022, Ashraf warned American election participants that campaigning for other nominees would create a favored list and eventually a subgroup inside Hizb ut-Tahrir.

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CHAPTER 05

Eight Candidates Became Six

Chicago’s candidate list created a second problem.

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CHAPTER 06

Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections

The Dallas dispute was easier to understand because the violation appeared inside the count itself.

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CHAPTER 07

Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed

Diwan was not only a candidate.

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CHAPTER 08

The Complaints Become a National Case

By the time the election moved toward final approval, complaints had reached the American leadership from Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago.

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CHAPTER 09

Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.

Fawzy communicated with Ata Abu Rashta through the recognized channel used by the American Mu’tamid to reach the global Amir.

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CHAPTER 10

Bilal Knew Before Fawzy

The most damaging concern about the channel did not come from technical metadata.

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CHAPTER 11

Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing

The emails carrying the Amir’s authority contained unusual technical details that raised questions about who was preparing and sending them.

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CHAPTER 12

The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer

Khalid, a senior Hizb ut-Tahrir member based in Chicago, had encountered a similar problem years before the 2025 election.

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CHAPTER 13

Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul

Abu Talha—Mohammad Malkawi—was not an ordinary member hearing the controversy secondhand.

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CHAPTER 14

Authority Before the Paperwork

Three episodes came to embody the same chronology: Abu Amr’s advance knowledge of a channel message, Khalid’s earlier complaint, and the transition to Abdu Rafy as Mu’tamid.

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CHAPTER 15

The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide

By the time the final election result reached Fawzy, the national leadership had already reviewed complaints from multiple localities.

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CHAPTER 16

“Why Don’t You Fire Him?”

The Dallas dispute did not disappear after leadership restored the original result.

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CHAPTER 17

Ayman Returns

Ayman’s case did not end when he was removed from the Majlis contest.

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CHAPTER 18

The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe

After Fawzy refused to sign the election result, leadership still had a problem.

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CHAPTER 19

The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election

The most important institutional fact in the entire story is also one of the simplest.

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CHAPTER 20

Inside the Machine

By this point, the role of the Mandub becomes essential to understanding why the American complaints were so difficult to resolve.

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CHAPTER 21

America Was Not the First Warning

The American crisis did not arise in a vacuum.

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CHAPTER 22

The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent

The American election controversy raises a disturbing question about the men who witnessed serious wrongdoing within Hizb ut-Tahrir and then continued promoting the organization as a model for Islamic revival.

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.

The 2025 American election ended with a recognized result.

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